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Abstract
Recently, there is growing concern that machine-learning
models, which currently assist or even automate decision
making, reproduce, and in the worst case reinforce, bias of
the training data. The development of tools and techniques
for certifying fairness of these models or describing their bi-
ased behavior is, therefore, critical. In this paper, we propose
a perfectly parallel static analysis for certifying causal fairness
of feed-forward neural networks used for classification tasks.
When certification succeeds, our approach provides definite
guarantees, otherwise, it describes and quantifies the biased
behavior. We design the analysis to be sound, in practice also
exact, and configurable in terms of scalability and precision,
thereby enabling pay-as-you-go certification. We implement
our approach in an open-source tool and demonstrate its
effectiveness on models trained with popular datasets.
1 Introduction
Due to the tremendous advances in machine learning and the
vast amounts of available data, software systems, and neural
networks in particular, are of ever-increasing importance
in our everyday decisions, whether by assisting them or
by autonomously making them. We are already witnessing
the wide adoption and societal impact of such software in
criminal justice, health care, and social welfare, to name a
few examples. It is, therefore, not far-fetched to imagine a
future where most of the decision making is automated.
However, several studies have recently raised concerns
about the fairness of such systems. For instance, consider a
commercial recidivism-risk assessment algorithm that was
found racially biased [39]. Similarly, a commercial algorithm
that is widely used in the U.S. health care system falsely
determined that Black patients were healthier than other
equally sick patients by using health costs to represent health
needs [52]. There is also empirical evidence of gender bias in
image searches, for instance, there are fewer results depicting
women when searching for certain occupations, such as
CEO [36]. Commercial facial recognition algorithms, which
are increasingly used in law enforcement, are less effective
for women and darker skin types [8].
In other words, machine-learning software may reproduce,
or even reinforce, bias that is directly or indirectly present
in the training data. This awareness will most definitely lead
to regulations and strict audits in the future. It is, therefore,
critical to develop tools and techniques for certifying fairness
of neural networks and understanding the circumstances of
their potentially biased behavior.
Causal fairness. To meet these needs, we have designed a
static analysis framework for certifying causal fairness [38]
of feed-forward neural networks. Specifically, given input
features that are sensitive to bias, like race or gender, a neural
network is causally fair if the output classification is not
affected by different values of the sensitive features.
Of course, the most obvious approach to avoid such bias is
to remove any sensitive feature from the training data. How-
ever, this does not work for three main reasons. First, neural
networks learn from latent variables (e.g., [41, 63]). For in-
stance, a credit-screening algorithm might not use gender
as an explicit input but still be biased with respect to it, say,
because most individuals whose first name ends in ‘a’ are
denied credit in the training data. Second, the training data
is only a relatively small sample of the entire input space,
on portions of which the neural network might end up be-
ing inaccurate. For example, if Asians are underrepresented
in the training data, facial recognition is less likely to be
accurate for these people. Third, the information provided
by a sensitive feature might be necessary, for instance, to
introduce intended bias in a certain input region. Assume
a credit-screening algorithm that should not discriminate
with respect to age unless it is above a particular threshold.
Above this age threshold, the higher the requested credit
amount, the lower the chances of receiving it. In such cases,
removing the sensitive feature is not even possible.
Our approach. Our approach certifies causal fairness of
neural networks used for classification by employing a com-
bination of a forward and a backward static analysis. On
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a high level, the forward pass aims to reduce the overall
analysis effort. At its core, it divides the input space of the
network into independent partitions. The backward analysis
then attempts to certify fairness of the classification within
each partition (in a perfectly parallel fashion) with respect to
a chosen (set of) sensitive feature(s). In the end, our approach
reports for which regions of the input space the neural net-
work is proved fair and for which there is bias. Note that we
do not necessarily need to analyze the entire input space; our
technique is also able to answer specific bias queries about a
fraction of the input space. For instance, are Hispanics over
45 years old discriminated against with respect to gender?
The scalability-vs-precision tradeoff of our approach is
configurable. Partitions that do not satisfy the given configu-
ration are excluded from the analysis and may be resumed
later, with a more flexible configuration. This enables usage
scenarios in which our approach adapts to the available re-
sources, e.g., time or CPUs, and is run incrementally. In other
words, we designed a pay-as-you-go certification approach
that the more resources it is given, the larger the region of
the input space it analyzes.
Related work. In the literature, most work on verifying fair-
ness of machine-learning models has focused on providing
probabilistic guarantees (e.g., [2, 7]). In contrast, our ap-
proach gives definite guarantees for those input partitions
that satisfy the analysis configuration. Moreover, our ap-
proach is exact for these partitions. In other words, the trade-
off in comparison to related work is that we might exclude
partitions for which our analysis is not exact. In this paper,
we investigate how far we can push such an exact analysis
in the context of fairness certification of neural networks.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
1. We propose a perfectly parallel static analysis approach
for certifying causal fairness of feed-forward neural
networks. If certification fails, our approach can de-
scribe and quantify the biased input space region(s).
2. We show that our approach is sound and, in practice,
exact for the analyzed regions of the input space.
3. We discuss the configurable scalability-vs-precision
tradeoff of our approach that enables pay-as-you-go
certification.
4. We implement our approach in an open-source tool
called libra and evaluate it on neural networks trained
with popular datasets. We show the effectiveness of
our approach in detecting injected bias and answering
bias queries. We also experiment with the precision
and scalability of the analysis and discuss the tradeoffs.
2 Overview
In this section, we give an overview of our approach using a
small constructed example, which is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Small, constructed example of trained feed-
forward neural network for credit approval.
Example. The figure depicts a feed-forward neural network
for credit approval. There are two inputs x0,1 and x0,2 (shown
in purple). Input x0,1 denotes the requested credit amount
and x0,2 denotes age. Both inputs have continuous values in
the range [0, 1]. Output x3,2 (shown in green) denotes that
the credit request is approved, whereas x3,1 (in red) denotes
that it is denied. The neural network also consists of two
hidden layers with two nodes each (in gray).
Now, let us assume that this neural network is trained to
deny requests for large credit amounts from older people.
Otherwise, the network does not discriminate with respect
to age for small credit amounts. There is also no bias for
younger people with respect to the requested credit. When
choosing age as the sensitive input, our approach can certify
fairness with respect to different age groups for small credit
amounts. Our approach is also able to find (as well as quan-
tify) bias with respect to the age for large credit amounts.
Note that this bias may be intended or accidental — our anal-
ysis does not aim to address this question. Below, we present
on a high level how our approach achieves these results.
Naïve approach. In theory, the simplest way to certify fair-
ness with respect to a given sensitive input is to first analyze
the neural network backwards starting from each output
node, in our case x3,1 and x3,2. This allows us to determine
the regions of the input space (i.e., age and requested credit
amount) for which credit is approved and denied. For exam-
ple, assume that we find that requests are denied for credit
amounts larger than 10 000 (i.e., 10 000 < x0,1) and age
greater than 60 (i.e., 60 < x0,2), while they are approved for
x0,1 ≤ 10 000 and 60 < x0,2 or for x0,2 ≤ 60.
The second step is to forget the value of the sensitive input
(i.e., age) or, in other words, to project these regions over the
credit amount. In our example, after projection we have that
credit requests are denied for 10 000 < x0,1 and approved
for any value of x0,1. A non-empty intersection between the
projected input regions indicates bias with respect to the
sensitive input. In our example, the intersection is non-empty
for 10 000 < x0,1: there exist people that differ in age but
request the same credit amount (smaller than 10 000), some
of whom receive the credit while others do not.
This approach, however, is not practical. Specifically, for a
neural network using the popular ReLU activation functions
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(see Section 3 for more details, other activation functions are
discussed in Section 9), each hidden node effectively repre-
sents a disjunction between two activation statuses (active
and inactive). In our example, there are 24 possible activa-
tion patterns for the 4 hidden nodes. To retain maximum
precision, a backward analysis would have to explore all of
them, which does not scale in practice.
Our approach. Our analysis is based on the observation
that there might exist many activation patterns that do not
correspond to a region of the input space [31]. Such patterns
can, therefore, be ignored during the analysis. We push this
idea further by defining abstract activation patterns, which fix
the activation status of only certain nodes and thus represent
sets of (concrete) activation patterns. Typically, a relatively
small number of abstract activation patterns is sufficient for
covering the entire input space, without necessarily represent-
ing and exploring all possible concrete patterns.
Identifying those patterns that definitely correspond to
a region of the input space is only possible with a forward
analysis. Hence, we combine a forward pre-analysis with
a backward analysis. The pre-analysis partitions the input
space into independent partitions corresponding to abstract
activation patterns. Then, the backward analysis tries to
prove fairness of the neural network for each such partition.
More specifically, we set an upper bound U on the number
of tolerated disjunctions (i.e., on the number of nodes with
an unknown activation status) per abstract activation pat-
tern. Our forward pre-analysis uses a cheap abstract domain
(e.g., the boxes domain [17]) to iteratively partition the input
space along the non-sensitive input dimensions to obtain fair
input partitions (i.e., boxes). Each partition satisfies one of
the following conditions: (a) its classification is already fair
because only one network output is reachable for all inputs
in the region, (b) it has an abstract activation pattern with
at most U unknown nodes, or (c) it needs to be partitioned
further. We call partitions that satisfy condition (b) feasible.
In our example, let U = 2. At first, the analysis considers
the entire input space, that is, x0,1 : [0, 1] (credit amount)
and x0,2 : [0, 1] (age). The abstract activation pattern corre-
sponding to this initial partition I is ϵ (i.e., no hidden nodes
have fixed activation status) and, thus, the number of dis-
junctions would be four, which is greater than U. Therefore,
I needs to be divided into I1 (x0,1 : [0, 0.5].x0,2 : [0, 1]) and I2
(x0,1 : [0.5, 1].x0,2 : [0, 1]). Note that the input space is not
split with respect to x0,2, which is the sensitive input. Now I1
is feasible since its abstract activation pattern is x1,2x2,1x2,2
(i.e., all three nodes are always active), while I2 must be
divided further since its abstract activation pattern is ϵ .
To control the number of partitions, we impose a lower
bound L on the size of each of their dimensions. Partitions
that require a dimension of a smaller size are excluded. In
other words, they are not considered until more analysis
budget becomes available, that is, a larger U or a smaller L.
In our example, let L = 0.25. The forward pre-analysis
further divides I2 into I2,1 (x0,1 : [0.5, 0.75].x0,2 : [0, 1]) and
I2,2 (x0,1 : [0.75, 1].x0,2 : [0, 1]). Now I2,1 is feasible, with
abstract pattern x1,2x2,1, while I2,2 still is not. However, I2,2
may not be split further because the size of the only non-
sensitive dimension x0,1 has already reached the lower bound
L. As a result, I2,2 is excluded, and only the remaining 75%
of the input space is considered for the analysis.
Feasible input partitions (within bounds L and U) are then
grouped by abstract activation patterns. In our example, the
pattern corresponding to I1, namely x1,2x2,1x2,2, is subsumed
by the (more abstract) pattern of I2,1, namely x1,2x2,1. Con-
sequently, we group I1 and I2,1 under the pattern x1,2x2,1.
The backward analysis is then run in parallel for each
representative abstract activation pattern, in our example
x1,2x2,1. This analysis determines the region of the input
space (within a given partition group) for which each output
of the neural network is returned, e.g., credit is approved
for c1 ≤ x0,1 ≤ c2 and a1 ≤ x0,2 ≤ a2. To achieve this, the
analysis uses an expensive abstract domain, for instance,
disjunctive or powerset polyhedra [19, 20], and leverages
abstract activation patterns to avoid disjunctions. For in-
stance, pattern x1,2x2,1 only requires reasoning about two
disjunctions from the remaining hidden nodes x1,1 and x2,2.
Finally, fairness is checked for each partition in the same
way that it is done by the naïve approach for the entire input
space. In our example, we prove that the classification within
I1 is fair and determine that within I2,1 the classification
is biased. Concretely, our approach determines that bias
occurs for 0.54 ≤ x0,1 ≤ 0.75, which corresponds to 21% of
the entire input space. In other words, the network returns
different outputs for people that request the same credit in
the above range but differ in age. Recall that partition I2,2,
where 0.75 ≤ x0,1 ≤ 1, was excluded from analysis, and
therefore, we cannot draw any conclusions about whether
there is any bias for people requesting credit in this range.
3 Feed-Forward Deep Neural Networks
Formally, a feed-forward deep neural network consists of an
input layer (l0), an output layer (ln), and a number of hidden
layers (l1, . . . , ln−1) in between. Each layer li contains |li |
nodes and, with the exception of the input layer, is associated
to a |li | × |li−1 |-matrixWi of weight coefficients and a vector
Bi of |li | bias coefficients. In the following, we use X to
denote the set of all nodes, Xi to denote the set of nodes of
the ith layer, and xi, j to denote the jth node of the ith layer
of a neural network. We focus here on neural networks used
for classification tasks. Thus, |ln | is the number of target
classes (e.g., two classes in Figure 1).
The value of the input nodes is given by the input data:
continuous data is represented by one input node (e.g., x0,1
or x0,2 in Figure 1), while categorical data is represented by
multiple input nodes via one-hot encoding. In the following,
Caterina Urban, Maria Christakis, Valentin Wüstholz, and Fuyuan Zhang
we use K to denote the subset of input nodes considered
sensitive to bias (e.g., x0,2 in Figure 1) and K
def
= X0 \ K to
denote the input nodes not deemed sensitive to bias.
The value of each hidden and output node xi, j is computed
by an activation function f applied to a linear combination
of the values of all nodes in the preceding layer [27], i.e.,
xi, j = f
(∑ |li−1 |
k w
i
j,k · xi−1,k + bi, j
)
, wherewij,k and bi, j are
weight and bias coefficients inWi and Bi , respectively. In a
fully-connected neural network, allwij,k are non-zero.Weights
and biases are adjusted during the training phase of the neu-
ral network. In what follows, we focus on already trained
neural networks, which we call neural-network models.
Nowadays, the most commonly used activation for hidden
nodes is the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) [50]: ReLU(x) =
max(x , 0). In this case, the activation used for output nodes is
the identity function. The output values are then normalized
into a probability distribution on the target classes [27]. We
discuss other activation functions in Section 9.
4 Trace Semantics
The semantics of a neural-network model is a mathematical
characterization of its behavior when executed for all pos-
sible input data. We model the operational semantics of a
feed-forward neural-network modelM as a transition system
⟨Σ,τ ⟩, where Σ is a (potentially infinite) set of states and the
acyclic transition relation τ ⊆ Σ × Σ describes the possible
transitions between states [16, 18].
More specifically, a state s ∈ Σmaps neural-network nodes
to their values. Here, for simplicity, we assume that nodes
have real values, i.e., s : X→ R. (We discuss floating-point
values in Section 9.) In the following, we often only care
about the values of a subset of the neural-network nodes
in certain states. Thus, let Σ
Y
def
=
{
s
Y
 s ∈ Σ} be the re-
striction of Σ to a domain of interest Y . Sets Σ
X0
and Σ
Xn
denote restrictions of Σ to the network nodes in the input
and output layer, respectively. With a slight abuse of no-
tation, let Xi, j denote Σ {xi, j } , i.e., the restriction of Σ to
the singleton set containing xi, j . Transitions happen be-
tween states with different values for consecutive nodes
in the same layer, i.e., τ ⊆ Xi, j × Xi, j+1, or between states
with different values for the last and first node of consecu-
tive layers of the network, i.e., τ ⊆ Xi, |li | × Xi+1,0. The set
Ω
def
= {s ∈ Σ | ∀s ′ ∈ Σ : ⟨s, s ′⟩ < τ } is the set of final states
of the neural network. These are partitioned in a set of
outcomes O def=
{{
s ∈ Ω | maxXn = xn,i
} | 0 ≤ i ≤ |ln |}, de-
pending on the output node with the highest value (i.e., the
target class with highest probability).
Let Σn def= {s0 · · · sn−1 | ∀i < n : si ∈ Σ} be the set of all
sequences of exactly n states in Σ. Let Σ+ def=
⋃
n∈N+ Σn be
the set of all non-empty finite sequences of states. A trace
is a sequence of states that respects the transition relation
τ , that is, ⟨s, s ′⟩ ∈ τ for each pair of consecutive states s, s ′
in the sequence. We write Σn for the set of all traces of
n states: Σn def= {s0 · · · sn−1 ∈ Σn | ∀i < n − 1 : ⟨si , si+1⟩ ∈ τ }.
The trace semantics ϒ ∈ P (Σ+) generated by a transition
system ⟨Σ,τ ⟩ is the set of all non-empty traces terminating
in Ω [16]:
ϒ
def
=
⋃
n∈N+
{
s0 . . . sn−1 ∈ Σn | sn−1 ∈ Ω
}
(1)
In the rest of the paper, we write JMK to denote the trace
semantics of a particular neural-network modelM.
The trace semantics fully describes the behavior of M.
However, reasoning about a particular property ofM does
not need all this information and, in fact, is facilitated by the
design of a semantics that abstracts away from irrelevant
details about M’s behavior. In the following sections, we
formally define our property of interest, causal fairness, and
systematically derive, using abstract interpretation [18], a
semantics tailored to reasoning about this property.
5 Causal Fairness
A property is specified by its extension, that is, by the set
of elements having such a property [18, 19]. Properties of
neural-network models are properties of their semantics.
Thus, properties of network models with trace semantics
in P (Σ+) are sets of sets of traces in P (P (Σ+)). In particu-
lar, the set of neural-network properties forms a complete
boolean lattice ⟨P (P (Σ+)) , ⊆,∪,∩, ∅,P (Σ+)⟩ for subset in-
clusion, that is, logical implication. The strongest property
is the standard collecting semantics Λ ∈ P (P (Σ+)):
Λ
def
= {ϒ} (2)
Let LMM denote the collecting semantics of a particular neural-
network modelM. Then, modelM satisfies a given property
H if and only if its collecting semantics is a subset ofH :
M |= H ⇔ LMM ⊆ H (3)
Here, we consider the property of causal fairness, which
expresses that the classification determined by a network
model does not depend on sensitive input data. In particular,
the property might interest the classification of all or just a
fraction of the input space.
More formally, letV be the set of all possible value choices
for all sensitive input nodes in K, e.g., for (x0,i , x0, j ) one-
hot encoding, say, gender information, V = {(1, 0), (0, 1)};
for x0,k encoding continuous data, say, in the range [0, 1],
a possibility is V = {[0, 0.25], [0.25, 0.75], [0.75, 1]}. In the
following, given a trace σ ∈ P (Σ+), we write σ0 and σω to
denote its initial and final state, respectively. We also write
σ0 =K σ
′
0 to indicate that the states σ0 and σ ′0 agree on all
values of all non-sensitive input nodes, and σω ≡ σ ′ω to
indicate that σ and σ ′ have the same outcome O ∈ O. We
can now formally define when the sensitive input nodes in
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K are unused with respect to a set of traces T ∈ P (Σ+) [64]
unusedK(T ) def= ∀σ ∈ T ,V ∈ V : σ0(K) , V ⇒
∃σ ′ ∈ T : σ0 =K σ ′0 ∧ σ ′0(K) = V ∧ σω ≡ σ ′ω ,
(4)
where σ0(K) def= {σ0(x) | x ∈ K} is the image of K under σ0.
Intuitively, the sensitive input nodes in K are unused if any
possible outcome in T (i.e., any outcome σω of any trace σ
in T ) is possible from all possible value choices for K (i.e.,
there exists a trace σ ′ in T for each value choice for K with
the same outcome as σ ). In other words, each outcome is
independent of the value choice for K.
Example 5.1. Let us consider again our example in Figure 1.
Wewrite ⟨c,a⟩ ⇝ o for a trace starting in a state with x0,1 = c
and x0,2 = a and ending in a state where o is the node with
the highest value (i.e., the output class). The sensitive input
x0,2 (age) is unused in T =
{⟨0.5,a⟩ ⇝ x3,2 | 0 ≤ a ≤ 1}. It
is instead used in T ′ =
{⟨0.75,a⟩ ⇝ x3,2 | 0 ≤ a < 0.51} ∪{⟨0.75,a⟩ ⇝ x3,1 | 0.51 ≤ a ≤ 1}.
The causal-fairness property FK can now be defined as
FK def= {JMK | unusedK(JMK)}, that is, as the set of all neural-
network models (or rather, their semantics) that do not use
the values of the sensitive input nodes for classification. In
practice, the property might interest just a fraction of the
input space, i.e., we define
FK[Y ] def=
{JMKY | unusedK(JMKY )} , (5)
where Y ∈ P (Σ) is a set of initial states of interest and the
restriction TY def= {σ ∈ T | σ0 ∈ Y } only contains traces of
T ∈ P (Σ+) that start with a state in Y . Similarly, in the
rest of the paper, we write SY def=
{
TY | T ∈ S} for the set
of sets of traces restricted to initial states in Y . Thus, from
Equation 3, we have the following:
Theorem 5.2. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔ LMMY ⊆ FK[Y ]
Proof. The proof follows trivially from Equation 3 and the
definition of FK[Y ] (cf. Equation 5) and LMMY . □
6 Dependency Semantics
We now use abstract interpretation to systematically derive,
by successive abstractions of the collecting semantics Λ, a
sound and complete semantics Λ⇝ that contains only and
exactly the information needed to reason about FK[Y ].
6.1 Outcome Semantics
LetTZ
def
= {σ ∈ T | σω ∈ Z } be the set of traces ofT ∈ P (Σ+)
that end with a state in Z ∈ P (Σ). As before, we write
SZ
def
= {TZ | T ∈ S} for the set of sets of traces restricted
to final states in Z . From the definition of FK[Y ] (and in
particular, from the definition of unusedK, cf. Equation 4),
we have the following result:
Lemma 6.1. LMMY ⊆ FK[Y ] ⇔ ∀O ∈ O : LMMYO ⊆ FK[Y ]
Proof. Let LMMY ⊆ FK[Y ]. From the definition of LMMY (cf.
Equation 2), we have that JMKY ∈ FK[Y ]. Thus, from the
definition of FK[Y ] (cf. Equation 5), we have unusedK(JMKY ).
Now, from the definition of unusedK (cf. Equation 4), we
equivalently have ∀O ∈ O : unusedK(JMKYO). Thus, we can
conclude that ∀O ∈ O : LMMYO ⊆ FK[Y ]. □
In particular, thismeans that in order to determinewhether
a neural-network modelM satisfies causal fairness, we can
independently verify, for each of its possible target classes
O ∈ O, that the values of its sensitive input nodes are unused.
We use this insight to abstract the collecting semantics
Λ by partitioning. More specifically, let • def= {Σ+O | O ∈ O}
be a trace partition with respect to outcome. We have the
following Galois connection
⟨P (P (Σ+) ) , ⊆⟩ −−−−→←−−−−α•γ• ⟨P (P (Σ+) ) , ⊆·⟩, (6)
where α•(S) def= {TO | T ∈ S ∧ O ∈ O}. The order ⊆· is the
pointwise ordering between sets of traces with the same
outcome, i.e., A ⊆· B def= ∧O∈O ÛAO ⊆ ÛBO, where ÛSZ denotes
the only non-empty set of traces in SZ . We can now define
the outcome semantics Λ• ∈ P (P (Σ+)) by abstraction of Λ:
Λ•
def
= α•(Λ) = {ϒO | O ∈ O} (7)
In the rest of the paper, we write LMM• to denote the outcome
semantics of a particular neural-network modelM.
6.2 Dependency Semantics
We observe that, to reason about causal fairness, we do not
need to consider all intermediate computations between the
initial and final states of a trace. Thus, we can further abstract
the outcome semantics into a set of dependencies between
initial states and outcomes of traces.
To this end, we define the following Galois connection1
⟨P (P (Σ+) ) , ⊆·⟩ −−−−−→←−−−−−α⇝γ⇝ ⟨P (P (Σ × Σ)) , ⊆·⟩, (8)
where α⇝(S) def= {{⟨σ0,σω ⟩ | σ ∈ T } | T ∈ S} [64] abstracts
away all intermediate states of any trace. We finally derive
the dependency semantics Λ⇝ ∈ P (P (Σ × Σ)):
Λ⇝
def
= α⇝(Λ•) = {{⟨σ0,σω ⟩ | σ ∈ ϒO} | O ∈ O} (9)
In the following, let LMM⇝ denote the dependency semantics
of a particular neural-network modelM.
LetRY def= {⟨s, _⟩ ∈ R | s ∈ Y } restrict a set of pairs of states
to pairs whose first element is in Y and, similarly, let SY def={
RY | R ∈ S} restrict a set of sets of pairs of states to first
elements in Y . The next result shows that Λ⇝ is sound and
complete for proving causal fairness:
Theorem 6.2. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔ LMMY⇝ ⊆· α⇝(α•(FK[Y ]))
1Note that here and in the following, for convenience, we abuse notation
and reuse the order symbol ⊆·, defined over sets of sets of traces, instead of
its abstraction, defined over sets of sets of pairs of states.
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Proof. Let M |= FK[Y ]. From Theorem 5.2, we have thatLMMY ⊆ FK[Y ]. Thus, from the Galois connections in Equa-
tion 6 and 8, we haveα⇝(α•(LMMY )) ⊆· α⇝(α•(FK[Y ])). From
the definition of LMMY⇝ (cf. Equation 9), we can then conclude
that LMMY⇝ ⊆· α⇝(α•(FK[Y ])). □
Corollary 6.3. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔ LMMY⇝ ⊆ α⇝(FK[Y ])
Proof. The proofs follows trivially from the definition of ⊆·
(cf. Equation 6 and 8) and Lemma 6.1. □
Furthermore, we observe that partitioning with respect to
outcome induces a partition of the space of values of the input
nodes used for classification. For instance, partitioning T ′ in
Example 5.1 induces a partition on the values of (the indeed
used node) x0,2. Thus, we can equivalently verify whetherLMMY⇝ ⊆ α⇝(FK[Y ]) by checking if the dependency seman-
tics LMMY⇝ induces a partition ofY K. Let R0 def= {s | ⟨s, _⟩ ∈ R}
(resp. Rω
def
= {s | ⟨_, s⟩ ∈ R}) be the selection of the first (resp.
last) element from each pair in a set of pairs of states. We
formalize this observation below.
Lemma 6.4. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔
∀A,B ∈ LMMY⇝ : (Aω , Bω ⇒ A0 K ∩ B0 K = ∅)
Proof. Let M |= FK[Y ]. From Corollary 6.3, we have thatLMMY⇝ ⊆ α⇝(FK[Y ]). Thus, from the definition of LMMY⇝ (cf.
Equation 9), we have ∀O ∈ O : α⇝(JMKYO) ∈ α⇝(FK[Y ]). In
particular, from the definition of α⇝ and FK[Y ] (cf. Equa-
tion 5), we have that unusedK(JMKYO) for each O ∈ O. From
the definition of unusedK (cf. Equation 4), for each pair of
non-empty JMKYO1 and JMKYO2 for different O1,O2 ∈ O (the
case in which one or both are empty is trivial), it must neces-
sarily be the value of the non-sensitive input nodes in K that
causes the different outcome O1 or O2. We can thus conclude
that ∀A,B ∈ LMMY⇝ : (Aω , Bω ⇒ A0 K ∩ B0 K = ∅). □
7 Naïve Causal-Fairness Analysis
In this section, we present a first static analysis for causal
fairness that computes a sound over-approximation Λ♮⇝ of
the dependency semanticsΛ⇝, i.e.,Λ⇝ ⊆· Λ♮⇝. This analysis
corresponds to the naïve approach we discussed in Section 2.
While it is too naïve to be practical, it is still useful for build-
ing upon later in the paper.
For simplicity, we consider ReLU activation functions. (We
discuss extensions to other activation functions in Section 9.)
The naïve static analysis is described in Algorithm 1. It takes
as input (cf. Line 14) a neural-network model M, a set of
sensitive input nodes K of M, a (representation of a) set of
initial states of interest Y , and an abstract domain A to be
used for the analysis. The analysis proceeds backward for
each outcome (i.e., each target class xn, j ) ofM (cf. Line 17)
in order to determine an over-approximation of the initial
states that satisfy Y and lead to xn, j (cf. Line 18).
Algorithm 1 : A Naïve Backward Analysis
1: function backward(M, A, x)
2: a← outcomeAJxK(newA)
3: for i ← n − 1 down to 0 do
4: for j ← |li | down to 0 do
5: a←←−−−−−assignAJxi, jK(←−−−reluAJxi, jKa)
6: return a
7: function check(O)
8: B← ∅ ▷ B: biased
9: for all o1, a1 ∈ O do
10: for all o2 , o1, a2 ∈ O do
11: if a1 ⊓A2 a2 , ⊥A2 then
12: B← B ∪ {a1 ⊓A2 a2}
13: return B
14: function analyze(M, K, Y , A)
15: O← Û∅
16: for j ← 0 up to |ln | do ▷ perfectly parallelizable
17: a← backward(M,A, xn, j )
18: O← O ∪
{
xn, j 7→ (assumeAJY Ka) K}
19: B← check(O)
20: return B = ∅,B ▷ fair: B = ∅, maybe biased: B , ∅
More specifically, the transfer function outcomeAJxK (cf.
Line 2) modifies a given abstract-domain element to assume
the given outcome x, that is, to assume thatmaxXn = x. The
transfer functions←−−−reluAJxi, jK and←−−−−−assignAJxi, jK (cf. Line 5)
respectively consider a ReLU operation and replace xi, j with
the corresponding linear combination of nodes in the pre-
ceding layer (see Section 3).
Finally, the analysis checks whether the computed over-
approximations satisfy causal fairness with respect to K (cf.
Line 19). In particular, it checks whether they induce a par-
tition of Y
K
as observed for Lemma 6.4 (cf. Lines 7-13). If so,
we have proved that M satisfies causal fairness. If not, the
analysis returns a set B of abstract-domain elements over-
approximating the input regions in which bias might occur.
Theorem 7.1. If analyze(M,K,Y ,A) of Algorithm 1 re-
turns true, ∅ thenM satisfies FK[Y ].
Proof (Sketch). analyze(M,K,Y ,A) in Algorithm 1 computes
an over-approximation a of the regions of the input space that
yield each target class xn, j (cf. Line 17). Thus, it actually com-
putes an over-approximation LMMY ♮⇝ of the dependency se-
mantics LMMY⇝, i.e., LMMY⇝ ⊆· LMMY ♮⇝ . Thus, if LMMY ♮⇝ satisfies
FK[Y ], i.e., ∀A,B ∈ LMMY ♮⇝ : (Aω , Bω ⇒ A0 K ∩ B0 K = ∅)
(according to Lemma 6.4, cf. Line 19), then by transitivity we
can conclude that also LMMY ♮⇝ necessarily satisfies FK[Y ]. □
In the analysis implementation, there is a tradeoff between
performance and precision, which is reflected in the choice of
abstract domain A and its transfer functions. Unfortunately,
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existing numerical abstract domains that are less expressive
than polyhedra [20] would make for a rather fast but too im-
precise analysis. This is because they are not able to precisely
handle constraints like maxXn = x, which are introduced
by outcomeAJxK to partition with respect to outcome.
Furthermore, even polyhedra would not be precise enough
in general. Indeed, each←−−−reluAJxi, jKwould over-approximate
what effectively is a conditional branch. Let |M| def= |l1 |+ · · ·+
|ln−1 | denote the number of hidden nodes (i.e., the number of
ReLUs) in a modelM. On the other side of the spectrum, one
could use a disjunctive completion [19] of polyhedra, thus
keeping a separate polyhedron for each branch of a ReLU.
This would yield a precise (in fact, exact) but extremely slow
analysis: even with parallelization (cf. Lines 16), each of the
|ln | processes would have to effectively explore 2 |M | paths!
In the rest of the paper, we improve on this naïve analysis
and show how far we can go all the while remaining exact
by using disjunctive polyhedra.
8 Parallel Semantics
We first have to take a step back and return to reasoning
at the concrete-semantics level. At the end of Section 6, we
observed that the dependency semantics of a neural-network
modelM satisfying FK[Y ] effectively induces a partition of
Y
K
. We call this input partition fair.
More formally, given a set Y of initial states of interest, we
say that an input partition I of Y is fair if all value choices V
for the sensitive input nodes K of M are possible in all ele-
ments of the partitions: ∀I ∈ I,V ∈ V : ∃s ∈ I : s(K) = V. For
instance, I =
{
T0,T
′
0
}
, with T and T ′ in Example 5.1 is a fair
input partition of Y =
{
s | s(x0,1) = 0.5 ∨ s(x0,1) = 0.75
}
.
Given a fair input partition I of Y , the following result
shows that we can verify whether a modelM satisfies FK[Y ]
for each element I of I, independently.
Lemma 8.1. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔
∀I ∈ I : ∀A,B ∈ LMMI⇝ : (Aω , Bω ⇒ A0 K ∩ B0 K = ∅)
Proof. The proof follows trivially from Lemma 6.4 and the
fact that I is a fair partition. □
We use this new insight to further abstract the dependency
semantics Λ⇝. We have the following Galois connection
⟨P (P (Σ × Σ)) , ⊆·⟩ −−−→←−−−αI
γI ⟨P (P (Σ × Σ)) , ⊆·I⟩, (10)
where αI(S) def=
{
RI | R ∈ S ∧ I ∈ I}. Here the order ⊆·I is the
pointwise ordering between sets of pairs of states restricted
to first elements in the same I ∈ I, i.e.,A ⊆·I B def= ∧I∈I ÛAI ⊆ ÛBI,
where ÛS I denotes the only non-empty set of pairs in S I. We
can now derive the parallel semantics ΠI⇝ ∈ P (P (Σ × Σ)):
ΠI⇝
def
= αI(Λ⇝) =
{{⟨σ0,σω ⟩ | σ ∈ ϒIO} | I ∈ I ∧ O ∈ O}
(11)
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⇧<latexit sha1_base64="zqfQEdmK4SI3FTRYfWz+DF8KlKw=">AAAt8Hic3Vpbb+O 4FfZub9v0NrNFMQ99IZoLko6TtZ1kkm4xwHYLLLbYwUx2JnMBooxBybRNhLpEpJJ4BfUv9LVvRV/70qe+tr+j/6aHpGRJNGUnTgIMaiCxRJ7znasODym7EaNcdDr//ejj733/B z/80Sc/XvnJT3/28188ePjpGx4msUdeeyEL43cu5oTRgLwWVDDyLooJ9l1G3rpnf5Tzby9IzGkYHItJRE59PArokHpYwFD/4aPN9dRRMCfxyD1NOzu9/YNO70kbLg729g/34G K30+0d9LI1xyUjGqSY0VFABtnKuvMMBA0w2niKHDaM3jv8nCcuJ4Kc/9k5HhOBHQeo1NXm8RbacAZkCIoOkANfmCHHx2IcEwYqJFGGNh2BExgkMcgZoeMtYCbBYCpxDWTeWtu+ EybCC30yVTt13ITxc0bOs1ztkqY0YDq2+apqCUyDwWluUT8NMzCADlCIHBqgFyiTFFMzQZCyNOepm6sZjxXjK5RZjL8T8wckAlwSeBPpAZgwfNBPlXbOKzrysSOoT7gecEORt ZFD/EhMYCArvVWBrDqsHF7sMyVn1ou5Exf50KOxh15qnpf368D3j6/vwhlXGcyls+oT/0fu6mth89zUaEaZYAqjmlpyoMFLynI/hTKYyaJz84eqe7DX3d8F2zoHB50n8qK3u9 fpHoKRnPg4ENTj6ZGtGl2TU6u/PP97J8AiiTG7BUQt326Bkz4ulMkWIM7JHRkyD7P0q6z/DSoXCR3PqjgVRicKL2FJK2uUj6+oDwroWDvDELRhiCrib5QSwJQECSeDPt2sAW6h W8RxGgetVt2KIBTOSzoaCxzH4aXNjCr9jfx1BLzhgDBuynxGhiL+gGRW1tGiMViowrWfoQXQs5rlefGq323Dv552iBWzyBkGCDuS4aRz6igoB5opIcE9HJXzvZn5p+U6eSM3Q 32aLaS3tGNDV847MWbDKKAr6zcK4R1Yc0dRsSp+73EpC+SHGJq7sFCubHbb5hp2X1Zdu2yNsO+bXdicFXNrXkW7XV5tNOoM7tywK96s9rWUboBeIqFzpHtM6NuldJNvZ42/4WK zrAPvp7bdud82FtvS1ApWE2NTWuaAvSN8qlqkp8qW6Ui1Ybq7RNrSlagenabsuqWflnh476DqLJt/dfgP8BFewmMNadjsO9Dx5X3EpI7bkBg39Qdm0bg8i7pZ/5zzLrvvU+zv Hy8lM9/wznDuHx50Oz1geNLZPdyXK+P+7w47T57IyKvzA4u0hTzz3HMN5rn+WchvddA1uG6l9Ox2fuX6ITqiNwvpEV0y/yTjskcER9Tq2AUcSys669D+g9WCBxU8qOBB3Z2O+q y28s9R/+Gv/ukMQi/xSSA8hjk/6XYicZriGOoII9mKk3ASYe8Mj8gJXAbYJ/w0VTpmaF2eViAo4PAXCKRGqxwp9jmf+C5QynLCzTk5aJs7ScTw8DSlQZQIME0LGiYMiRDJFwR oQGPiCTaBC+zFFHRF3hjH2BMk5is1MVz4OJ7Eg5opqaBn3+kRecWoGwNRqoogb+NEhKATbg+IB4uTfAnBdyJQ0g/jaEyDURtuQFLA21HIqZyXg3yMI8J3NEhd3BWHK/AmfNbRB Y5pmIDBAbmEsEPNHqTOOSFZ6oyHlLHU4WBTJDj9jqA1x2UAws8THEOCgCsQxBuFQ0SusB8xUochwYhRPgYoQa6EEGkxkNXplMtLKhUIg4R7FHxPSqJiwKBzwyCpQOlbgyaCzA IXlVTFgEHHSFDSyBtjfhTjAakIy+9lzUbSBlgA5fpXZ8qP6jLpHZ7EkmYM5glwqzp89t3wChBpAOlEhlmWPs2Un0tAzJACUaE2wEPfAM6PduWEgoELDC0NRAyjYRJ4sxjFaHa ye1rDWu3m3c4qtEWVBmN1VyHb0UbDyK6RnFB8o5hgQbhAQ3oVhTQQRhCaAFgBwAhu5k5cOzdPatxJFJEYuWESDOoA0BdZAFw3fa7Zi+PMIPFd+bTXk5aI7KRb96LqAh3pTN0Ba hi5BannaH5gO8tftEJHmYLaLJC2pkDQRVWhZCOh3x6k5TsOeRFhRqBy6HeQ5BwrSo0yfSuJHiM3YUztkGqm5TzZSe80hXYMIScMVc+aroFGJcCa48VqekwH5JIOxNiJMYUCSq 8weCFzxjLhgWe15/hnUMZ29v1kLQMuWEHkiQrkesmx2k0VGB1egZQB5RHDEy4mUHlgGCYUJawxvX1ypSihfSzmNJN8WCscFp4a15QvL4NVzoJ3p3vYKVgN5pJkv0oypLkgfaG+ MmSUsuKlz/ywuQ7zBqFojFsF87dpTptqpaTnt6EzIleZrLCAK0e6O/tZCmEDQijxZh3OheZxnx92a9TdRVEHidWYuzLm9pBXo7cH3i18b412PdiavMpgDbQ1ztUwW6NcBrn8l v8tEZYvGtPSh/KtvnSd6TednLnXdBC133rQzxWekxkA/NbQ6zKgpU2zabHYbilUHVMqmd0yWBWZct6SwKaBauRWJiqEprqki12jnc3Sr2VpIbrJVjxjK7ZL27uupbjR0lB3YU1 2qg7N6uZdm6W9GUslQGEq1CgR40B3l4jD40d83pZjHoHv6Vbf6CTkO2pj9Xwhj610v6B+zwKNDyz+dT7VaXP7uv0nrZ4iUb0rdpnJP4amPJ7qZFmBWQS2BdBPccrRahce3rgy kq+jVpOK96Y1QHl+QoOhmBSdmqLR3mkE0j9hsRkJkfx9jpT/zgW6Ne3qOkYIZqr9wIyXGYZGmyD9sretf8EQqzGFOxNLAzcRzQF4oVXTNE0RmOt82N14Z0Tkjs/v5jldJLCzUA uOzcjVblt3pNo+p9jd1CAuMEtIg0VvsikTkvshSWlwX+RNvtpTprFq39XK4qVC+0OxgWMTYws0HNZYXaAqeYdV3iGW68nKehTLuIqJUV+CYV37zz9/2mCrShWLqbJpPM6KBID UtEvi3GtgfpWXBrXEb3sslPttO4h6BBtgvtYwwAgbJr8BIOGwU20AeF4LmC4FA9ghI8XUBKh+zFD6Pr9XmzXscukRtbVuT+/yvZIcgSdsws2sqHAZ9WB6mmpERm4zRwZxoU8+ V7VMD8nDEHMLaUYox5ATVQC4h80VJyZ7cUgj+0C5dYBiT0dqM5eZFZyJmTgWyavnqvL0kAHBANX63H1V4+XEAwKI5jCMfVXVkGTNfU9nlogGF8iJenbYXHBGYUGtJMPl7Nb/At q7hvx7Nqs4FRPEsIDaRWZqqTxMy1SHAIu4eRQRmrvbXCM5UZMiDwgQjBr8iTpesQHIGQsCDJtPWhhUHgv13BlaJkmSpa/NnQAH/3xpDF5eQrDfGoNBAAKem+zEuvj56R/qz0A c40lDEiiL7CDf1kB0XbCDyBWMiElDqM21QdHOAqgl0K7JuxkERYw+g4DEISxZkDj0gkxnmtU0BeQRUzN2GTRQnVsYMgONTWJcxlzd2deSaCLG1fTI76fE/QerxTkuar5409vp7 u70vu2tfvFlftj7SevXrd+0Nlvd1kHri9bXraPW65b36C+P/vXo34/+sx1v/3X7b9t/16Qff5Tz/LJV+2z/43/TFUHf</latexit>
⇤
<latexit sha1_base64="iT+3uuYiMggFzKCK7Pjvjaidrvw=">AAAlAHiczVnNb+S 2FZ8k/Ujd1tlt0FMvRMde2N3JdGZsx0aKBdIUCFJkseusvR+A5TUoiZohTH1YpGxPBPXQf6TX3oJee++1Pfe/6SMpjSQOZXttB+kA9kjkez++Lz6+x3ETRrkYjf773vsf/OjH P/nphz9b+fkvfrn60YOHv3rF4yz1yEsvZnH6xsWcMBqRl4IKRt4kKcGhy8hr9/RPcv71OUk5jaNDMU/IcYinEQ2ohwUMnTxc3VvPHQVzlE7d43w0nOzsjiafDuBhd3tnbxset kbjye6kWHNcMqVRjhmdRsQvVtadp7CQj9GjJ8hhQfLW4Wc8czkR5OwvzuGMCOw4QKWeNg430SPHJwEI6iMHvjBDTojFLCUMRMiSAm04AmcwSFJYZ4oON4GZRP5ixTVY887Snjh xJrw4JAuxc8fNGD9j5Kwoxa5pagUWYxsHTU1gGhTOS41O8rgABaiPYuTQCD1HhaRYqAkLKU1Lnra6mvFQMR6g4vtR3icJoJLIm0v9YcKwwEmuZHMO6DTEjqAh4XrAjUUxQA4J EzGHgaK2VQOyaa56+HqLqXWWbVia8DoLejT10AvN8+IK892LAdViV5muU43aYgqjaSs50GElpXmYw64u5B66NkaWlBzvbo93tkC30e7u6FP5MNnaHo33QElOQhwJ6vF83xZfN +TU4t+e/60TYZGlmL1biEvDeJjlXxYnX6M6s2irNfGVsZwkvoA8WId2iC9piFnpIyeIQQCGqCL+WgkBTFmUceKf0I0W4Ca6g7UW2mqx2lpEsXBe0OlM4DSNL2xqNOnfyV77wB v7hHFzzackEOn/0ZqN5FudJteKcONIvQZ6WbIyLg5OxgP4N9EGsWJWMcMAYSgZjkbHjoJy4AQWEtzDST0/WZp/UqfXdzIzZIHldHVHPR7p/HQvyjwy0tTK+g+hXn0e/UAadgf pPWko07BdtysV+778duPdP8Vh2C4YOl23eS9J4S6SlUPqxLbYf/N+JHQwS2Z1zXkr3lrqW7C/fXyrNctK4OZ8uqx6t5PfKORvx3ylda7lt5rnBlx3Elqy31XszmLtRrwJlkmIy Ert5EG/ciyqHIsqx6LxcKQ+/V752T95+OvvHD/2spBEwmOY86PxKBHHOU5hAzFSrDhQayXYO8VTcgSPEYae4DhXQhZoXRZiCJIg/EUCqdEmR45DzuehC5Ry03FzTg7a5o4yEe wd5zRKMgFW1QsFGUMiRrJhRj5NiSfYHB6wl1KQFXkzMIMnoJxcaS3DRYjTeeq3VMkFPf1Wj8gnRt0UiHKVYPgAZyIGmfDAJx4keNmU82ECQoZxmsygLRzAC6wU8UEScyrn5SC f4YTwoQZpL3fJ4QmsCZ91dI5TGmegcEQuIOogWfm5c0ZIkTuzgDLopzjolAhOvyUImh4GIPwswynEJ5gCQaihOEDkEocJI20YEk0Z5TOAEuRSCJFXA0WbTpm8plKOMEi4R8H2 pCaqBgw6N4Z6vKbSrwZNApEFJqqpqgGDjpGoppEvxvw0xT5pLFa+F9KsUgfI/DLxt5nKLqSQ1uFZKmlmoJ4As6ruNXTjS0CkEYQTCYoif1IoO9eA0BcoEOVqAzwODeCyN5QTC gYeMJQF4DGMgizyljGq0eJo67iF1R+X9WsfSovGEdjfUsh2tGmQ2CWSE4pvmhIsCBcooJdJTCNhOKELgFUAjOBu7sy1c/OsxZ0lCUmRG2eR3waATswC4Lr5M81edWpRFrpyt7e DlojiaNy2oiqqHGlMXVNpGKA0YrTsRZf5q4Jhv1BQGxXS5gIIarImlMzm+vohry9J5EOCGYHMoe/kyBlWlBplcUuHHiM3g3wuDNCKpziaHOfrEPDIiWNVBeZrIFENsOZ4qZqe UZ9cUF/MnBRTSKD0EoMVCmcmAx54+hMnPIU0NtwJs7UCuOAAklUuxHrN0R/nCowGl7CKT3nC8JyLOWQeGIYJRQlnzGSHXCpKKOGqOc0kN2uDw8LT4lrwlWmwyVnxDsd7o4rVY K5JdpokAS0X0g/qq0BGKqtuja52m+swz49Fp98amL/LS9pcCyUt/8loCGoXMsMCrhwZD3eKHNwGhJDizTxcLlr6/Wq3W73uXud1WLHpc1f63O7ypve2wbqV7a3ebjtbkzcZrI 62+rnpZquXayfX3/K/xcPypjKvbShvuaXpTLvp4Cytpp2o7TaBqqyynIwA4Le6XqcBvdoimq5fdlwvqlpHtea4dlZjTTlvCWBTQTVyJxUVQlde0smuU8/u1W+kabV0l654SVd sX237ppriTk1jXYV16akqNKuZt2yaTpY0lQCVqpCjRIojXV0iDtuPhHwgxzwC34se16gk5CW3cXo+D8kU63pB/b4DhQ8c/m0+VWlz+7n9Zy2eIlG1K3aZyT+DojxdyGQ5gRk0 KdBizAinHPXHsHnTxkh5jlpVqq6EW4Bv88cgcyDmVaWmaLR1OoH0Tzo2JcGTfyiRyt99oFrTpm5jxKCm6geWrMwwFNoE6Xvsgf4JJFVjCnfJlwZuJrod8FyLpmm6PHCl8aG78U 6JKA1fvl1ldJFBZ6EOHJuS/fFAV6RaP6fqbloQ55hlpEOjV8WCCcl+SFIa3Odlka96yjxV5bs6WbxcaHsoNjBsZrRAQdBidYGq5g2avAGW58nKepJKv4q5kV+ioC39Z5896dB VhYpFVVk0HhZVAEBo2lfi3OtgPihTgzriP/FYLPttO4jagh0wX2kYYISGKewAyDh0qh0Az1oO06nAhw4ZKaYuQPU7TW378l01a9jl0iKqtR4s3speSY7ADptzMyoaXEY+qH6/ MYsn2WZODeJKnnKuqZkekpchZgtpeqjEkBNNAHiH5ooTk726H5J1oGwdINnTqWrmCjODM7Hkxyp49VxzPT1kQDBAte67L1u8nHhAAN4M4jRUWQ1J1tL2dOmI6DCBnGhHh80Ep xQO1EYwXCy3/udQ3nXE39NlwamYI4YF5C6ylEvlXV6hKgQ4xM2riNjsbkuJ5ERrFXlBgGDU4M/U9YoNQM5YEGDY3Glx1NgWat8ZUmZZVuQvzU6Ag32+MAYvLsDZr43BKIIFnp nsxHr4hfkf23sgTfG8IwiURnaQb1ogOi/YQeQJRsS8w9Xm2aBolwHUEWiX5M0SgiJGvweHpDEcWRA49JwsZrrFNBcoPaZm7GvQSFVuccwMNDZPce1z9WY/S5K5mDXDo3xfEJ88 6Ff3uKj74dVkON4aTr6Z9D//orzs/bD3m95vexu9cW+393nvq95+72XPW/3b6r9W/736n7W/rv197bu1f2jS998reT7utT5r//wf+5dA+w==</latexit>
⇤•<latexit sha1_base64="kuinz/me8+58F3QR5/c44DI8SWQ=">AAAlAHiczVnNb+S 2FZ8k/Ujd1tlt0FMvRMde2N3JdGZsx0aKBdIUCFJksevsej8Ay2tQEjVDmPqwSNmeCOqh/0ivvQW99t5re+5/00dSGkkcyt9BOoA9Evnej++Lj+9x3IRRLkaj/773/gc/+vFP fvrhz1Z+/otfrn704OGvXvM4Sz3yyotZnL51MSeMRuSVoIKRt0lKcOgy8sY9+ZOcf3NGUk7j6EDME3IU4mlEA+phAUPHD1f31nNHwRymU/coHw0nO7ujyacDeNjd3tnbhoet0 XiyOynWHJdMaZRjRqcR8YuVdecpLORj9OgJcliQvHP4Kc9cTgQ5/YtzMCMCOw5QqaeNg030yPFJAIL6yIEvzJATYjFLCQMRsqRAG47AGQySFNaZooNNYCaRv1hxDda8s7THTpw JLw7JQuzccTPGTxk5LUqxa5pagcXYxsumJjANCuelRsd5XIAC1EcxcmiEnqNCUizUhIWUpiVPW13NeKAYX6Li+1HeJwmgksibS/1hwrDAca5kc17SaYgdQUPC9YAbi2KAHBIm Yg4DRW2rBmTTXPXw1RZT6yzbsDThVRb0aOqhF5rnxSXmuxcDqsUuM12nGrXFFEbTVnKgw0pK8zCHXV3IPXRljCwpOd7dHu9sgW6j3d3Rp/JhsrU9Gu+BkpyEOBLU4/m+Lb6uy anFvz3/OyfCIksxu1mIS8N4mOVfFsdfozqzaKs18ZWxnCQ+hzxYh3aIL2iIWekjJ4hBAIaoIv5aCQFMWZRx4h/TjRbgJrqDtRbaarHaWkSxcF7Q6UzgNI3PbWo06W9kr33gjX 3CuLnmUxKI9P9ozUbyrU6TK0W4dqReAb0sWRkXL4/HA/g30QaxYlYxwwBhKBkOR0eOgnLgBBYS3MNJPT9Zmn9Sp9cbmRmywHK6uqMej3R+uhdlHhlpamX9h1CvPo9+IA27g/S eNJRp2K7bpYp9X3679u6f4jBsFwydrtu8l6RwF8nKIXViW+y/eT8SOpgls7rmvBVvLfUt2N89vtWaN68EdF0FPDdlucw4l5QNy4Xwbfit5rkG152Elux3FbvTRdfiTbBMQkRWa scP+pWTUOUkVDkJjYcj9en3ys/+8cNff+f4sZeFJBIew5wfjkeJOMpxChuIkWLFgVorwd4JnpJDeIww9ARHuRKyQOuyEEOQBOEvEkiNNjlyHHI+D12glJuOm3Ny0DZ3mIlg7y inUZIJsKpeKMgYEjGSDTPyaUo8webwgL2UgqzIm4EZPAHl5EprGS5CnM5Tv6VKLujJt3pEPjHqpkCUqwTDBzgTMciEBz7xIMHLppwPExAyjNNkBm3hAF5gpYgPkphTOS8H+Qw nhA81SHu5Cw5PYE34rKMznNI4A4Ujcg5RB8nKz51TQorcmQWUQT/FQadEcPotQdD0MADhpxlOIT7BFAhCDcUBIhc4TBhpw5BoyiifAZQgF0KIvBoo2nTK5DWVcoRBwj0Ktic1 UTVg0Lkx1OM1lX41aBKILDBRTVUNGHSMRDWNfDHmpyn2SWOx8r2QZpU6QOaXib/NVHYhhbQOz1JJMwP1BJhVda+hG18AIo0gnEhQFPmTQtm5BoS+QIEoVxvgcWgAl72hnFAw8 IChLACPYRRkkbeMUY0Wh1tHLaz+uKxf+1BaNI7A/pZCtqNNg8QukZxQfNOUYEG4QAG9SGIaCcMJXQCsAmAEd3Nnrp2bZy3uLElIitw4i/w2AHRiFgDXzZ9p9qpTi7LQlbu9HbR EFIfjthVVUeVIY+qaSsMApRGjZS+6zF8VDPuFgtqokDYXQFCTNaFkNtfXD3l9SSIfEswIZA59J0dOsaLUKItbOvQYuRnkc2GAVjzF4eQoX4eAR04cqyowXwOJaoA1x0vV9Iz6 5Jz6YuakmEICpRcYrFA4MxnwwNOfOOEJpLHhTpitFcAFB5CsciHWa47+OFdgNLiAVXzKE4bnXMwh88AwTChKOGMmO+RCUUIJV81pJrlZGxwWnhbXgq9Mg03Oinc43htVrAZzT bLTJAlouZB+UF8FMlJZdWt0udtch3l+LDr91sD8XV7S5looaflPRkNQu5AZFnDlyHi4U+TgNiCEFG/m4XLR0u+Xu93qdfcqr8OKTZ+70ud2lze9tw3WrWxv9Xbb2Zq8yWB1tN XPTTdbvVw7uf6W/y0eljeVeW1DecstTWfaTQdnaTXtRG23CVRlleVkBAC/1fU6DejVFtF09bLjelHVOqo1x7WzGmvKeUsAmwqqkTupqBC68pJOdp16dq9+LU2rpbt0xUu6Yvt q29fVFHdqGusqrEtPVaFZzbxl03SypKkEqFSFHCVSHOnqEnHYfiTkAznmEfhe9LhGJSEvuY3T83lIpljXC+r3HSh84PBv86lKm9vP7T9r8RSJql2xy0z+GRTl6UImywnMoEmB FmNGOOWoP4bNmzZGynPUqlJ1JdwCfJc/BpkDMa8qNUWjrdMJpH/SsSkJnvxDiVT+7gPVmjZ1GyMGNVU/sGRlhqHQJkjfYw/0TyCpGlO4S740cDPR7YDnWjRN0+WBS40P3Y13Qk Rp+PLtMqOLDDoLdeDYlOyPB7oi1fo5VXfTgjjDLCMdGr0uFkxI9kOS0uA+K4t81VPmqSrf1cni5ULbQ7GBYTOjBQqCFqsLVDVv0OQNsDxPVtaTVPpVzI38EgVt6T/77EmHrip ULKrKovGgqAIAQtO+EudeB/PLMjWoI/4Tj8Wy37aDqC3YAfOVhgFGaJjCDoCMQ6faAfCs5TCdCnzokJFi6gJUv9PUti/fVbOGXS4tolrrweKt7JXkCOywOTejosFl5IPq9xuz eJJt5tQgruQp55qa6SF5GWK2kKaHSgw50QSAd2iuODHZq/shWQfK1gGSPZ2qZq4wMzgTS36sglfPNdfTQwYEA1TrvvuyxcuJBwTgzSBOQ5XVkGQtbU+XjogOE8iJdnTYTHBC4 UBtBMP5cut/BuVdR/w9XRacijliWEDuIku5VN7lFapCgEPcvIqIze62lEhOtFaRFwQIRg3+TF2v2ADkjAUBhs2dFkeNbaH2nSFllmVF/srsBDjY5wtj8PwcnP3GGIwiWOCZyU 6sh1+Y/7G9B9IUzzuCQGlkB/mmBaLzgh1EnmBEzDtcbZ4NinYZQB2BdkneLiEoYvR7cEgaw5EFgUPPyGKmW0xzgdJjasa+Bo1U5RbHzEBj8xTXPldv9rMkmYtZMzzK9wXx8YN+ dY+Luh9eT4bjreHkm0n/8y/Ky94Pe7/p/ba30Rv3dnuf977q7fde9bzVv63+a/Xfq/9Z++va39e+W/uHJn3/vZLn417rs/bP/wF8rkD2</latexit>
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Figure 2. Hierarchy of semantics.
In fact, we derive a hierarchy of semantics, as depicted in
Figure 2. We write {|M|}I⇝ to denote the parallel semantics
of a particular neural-network modelM. It remains to show
soundness and completeness for ΠI⇝.
Theorem8.2. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔ {|M|}I⇝ ⊆·I αI(α⇝(α•(FK[Y ])))
Proof. Let M |= FK[Y ]. From Theorem 6.2, we have thatLMMY⇝ ⊆· α⇝(α•(FK[Y ])). Thus, from the Galois connections
in Equation 10, we have αI(LMMY⇝) ⊆· αI(α⇝(α•(FK[Y ]))).
From the definition of {|M|}I⇝ (cf. Equation 11), we can then
conclude that {|M|}I⇝ ⊆·I αI(α⇝(α•(FK[Y ]))). □
Corollary 8.3. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔ {|M|}I⇝ ⊆ αI(α⇝(FK[Y ]))
Proof. The proofs follows trivially from the definition of ⊆·I
(cf. Equation 6 and 8 and 10) and Lemma 6.1 and 8.1. □
Finally, from Lemma 8.1, we have that we can equivalently
verify whether {|M|}I⇝ ⊆ αI(α⇝(FK[Y ])) by checking if the
parallel semantics {|M|}I⇝ induces a partition of each I K.
Lemma 8.4. M |= FK[Y ] ⇔
∀I ∈ I : ∀A,B ∈ {|M|}I⇝ : (AIω , BIω ⇒ AI0 K ∩ BI0 K = ∅)
Proof. The proof follows trivially from Lemma 8.1. □
9 Parallel Causal-Fairness Analysis
In this section, we build on the parallel semantics to design
our novel perfectly parallel static analysis for causal fairness,
which automatically finds a fair partition I and computes a
sound over-approximation ΠI♮⇝ of ΠI⇝, i.e., ΠI⇝ ⊆·I ΠI♮⇝.
ReLU activation functions. We again only consider ReLU
activation functions for now and postpone the discussion
of other activation functions to the end of the section. The
analysis is described in Algorithm 2. It combines a forward
pre-analysis (Lines 15-24) with a backward analysis (Lines 28-
38). The forward pre-analysis uses an abstract domain A1
and builds partition I, while the backward analysis uses an
abstract domain A2 and performs the actual causal-fairness
analysis of a neural-network model M with respect to its
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Algorithm 2 : Our Analysis Based on Activation Patterns
1: function forward(M, A, I)
2: a, p← assumeAJIK(newA), ϵ
3: for i ← 1 up to n do
4: for j ← 0 up to |li | do
5: a, p← −−−→relupAJxi, jK(−−−−−→assignAJxi, jKa)
6: return a, p
7: function backward(M, A, O, p)
8: a← outcomeAJOK(newA)
9: for i ← n − 1 down to 0 do
10: for j ← |li | down to 0 do
11: a←←−−−−−assignAJxi, jK(←−−−relupAJxi, jKa)
12: return a
13: function analyze(M, K, Y , A1, A2, L, U)
14: F,E,C← Û∅, Û∅, ∅ ▷ F: feasible, E: excluded, C: completed
15: I← {Y }
16: while I , ∅ do ▷ perfectly parallelizable
17: I ← I.get()
18: a, p← forward(M,A1, I)
19: if uniqely-classified(a) then ▷ I is already fair
20: C← C ∪ {I}
21: else if |M| − |p| ≤ U then ▷ I is feasible
22: F← F ⊎ {p 7→ I}
23: else if |I| ≤ L then ▷ I is excluded
24: E← E ⊎ {p 7→ I}
25: else ▷ I must be partitioned further
26: I← I ∪ partitionK(I)
27: B← ∅ ▷ B: biased
28: for all p, I ∈ F do ▷ perfectly parallelizable
29: O← Û∅
30: for j ← 0 up to |ln | do
31: a← backward(M,A2, xn, j , p)
32: O← O ∪ {xn, j 7→ a}
33: for all I ∈ I do
34: O’← Û∅
35: for all o, a ∈ O do
36: O’← O’ ∪
{
o 7→ (assumeA2JIKa) K}
37: B← B ∪ check(O’)
38: C← C ∪ {I}
39: return C,B = ∅,B,E ▷ fair: B = ∅, maybe biased: B , ∅
sensitive input nodes K and a (representation of a) set of
initial states Y (cf. Line 13).
More specifically, the forward pre-analysis bounds the
number of paths that the backward analysis has to explore.
Indeed, not all of the 2 |M | paths of a modelM are necessarily
viable starting from its input space.
In the rest of this section, we represent each path by an
activation pattern, which determines the activation status of
every ReLU operation in M. More precisely, an activation
pattern is a sequence of flags. Each flag pi, j represents the
activation status of the ReLU operation used to compute the
value of hidden node xi, j . If pi, j is xi, j , the ReLU is always
active, otherwise the ReLU is always inactive and pi, j is xi, j .
An abstract activation pattern gives the activation status
of only a subset of the ReLUs ofM, and thus, represents a set
of activation patterns. ReLUs whose corresponding flag does
not appear in an abstract activation pattern have an unknown
(i.e., not fixed) activation status. Typically, only a relatively
small number of abstract activation patterns is sufficient for
covering the entire input space of a neural-network model. The
design of our analysis builds on this key observation.
We set an analysis budget by providing an upper bound
U (cf. Line 13) on the number of tolerated ReLUs with an
unknown activation status for each element I of I, i.e., on
the number of paths that are to be explored by the backward
analysis in each I. The forward pre-analysis starts with the
trivial partition I = {Y } (cf. Line 15). It proceeds forward for
each element I in I (cf. Lines 17-18). The transfer function−−−→relupAJxi, jK considers a ReLU operation and additionally
builds an abstract activation patternp for I (cf. Line 5) starting
from the empty pattern ϵ (cf. Line 2).
If I leads to a unique outcome (cf. Line 19), then causal
fairness is already proved for I, and there is no need for a
backward analysis; I is added to the set of completed parti-
tions (cf. Line 20). Instead, if abstract activation pattern p
fixes the activation status of enough ReLUs (cf. Line 21), we
say that the backward analysis for I is feasible. In this case, the
pair of p and I is inserted into a map F from abstract activa-
tion patterns to feasible partitions (cf. Line 22). The insertion
takes care of merging abstract activation patterns that are
subsumed by other (more) abstract patterns. In other words,
it groups partitions whose abstract activation patterns fix
more ReLUs with partitions whose patterns fix fewer ReLUs,
and therefore, represent a superset of (concrete) patterns.
Otherwise, I needs to be partitioned further, with respect
to K (cf. Line 25). Partitioning may continue until the size
of I is smaller than the given lower bound L (cf. Lines 13
and 23). At this point, I is set aside and excluded from the
analysis until more resources (a larger upper bound U or a
smaller lower bound L) become available (cf. Line 24).
Note that the forward pre-analysis lends itself to choosing
a relatively cheap abstract domain A1 since it does not need
to precisely handle polyhedral constraints (like maxXn = x,
needed to partition with respect to outcome, cf. Section 7).
The analysis then proceeds backwards, independently for
each abstract activation path p and associated group of parti-
tions I (cf. Lines 28 and 31). The transfer function←−−−relupAJxi, jK
uses p to choose which path(s) to explore at each ReLU op-
eration, i.e., only the active (resp. inactive) path if xi, j (resp.
xi, j ) appears in p, or both if the activation status of the ReLU
corresponding to the hidden node xi, j is unknown. The (as
we have seen, necessarily) expensive backward analysis only
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needs to run for each abstract activation pattern in the fea-
sible map F . This is also why it is advantageous to merge
subsumed abstract activation paths as described above.
Finally, the analysis checks causal fairness of each element
I associated to p (cf. Line 37). The analysis returns the set of
input-space regions C that have been completed and a set B
of abstract-domain elements over-approximating the regions
in which bias might occur (cf. Line 39). If B is empty, then
the given neural-network modelM satisfies causal fairness
with respect to K and Y over C .
Theorem 9.1. If function analyze(M,K,Y ,A1,A2, L,U) in
Algorithm 2 returns C, true, ∅, thenM satisfies FK[Y ] over
the input-space fraction C .
Proof (Sketch). analyze(M,K,Y ,A1,A2, L,U) in Algorithm 2
first computes the abstract activation patterns that cover a
fractionC of the input space in which the analysis is feasible
(Lines 15-24). Then, it computes an over-approximation a of
the regions of C that yield each target class xn, j (cf. Line 31).
Thus, it actually computes an over-approximation {|M|}I♮⇝ of
the parallel semantics {|M|}I⇝, i.e., {|M|}I⇝ ⊆· {|M|}I♮⇝. Thus, if
{|M|}I♮⇝ satisfies FK[Y ], i.e., ∀I ∈ I : ∀A,B ∈ {|M|}I♮⇝ : (AIω ,
BIω ⇒ AI0 K∩BI0 K = ∅) (according to Lemma 8.4, cf. Lines 33-
37), then by transitivity we can conclude that also {|M|}I♮⇝
necessarily satisfies FK[Y ]. □
Remark. Recall that we assumed neural-network nodes to
have real values (cf. Section 4). Thus, Theorem 9.1 is true for
all choices of classical numerical abstract domains [17, 20, 25,
47, etc.] for A1 and A2. If we were to consider floating-point
values instead, the only sound choices would be floating-
point abstract domains [13, 45, 57].
Other activation functions. Let us discuss how activation
functions other than ReLUs would be handled. The only
difference in Algorithm 2 would be the transfer functions−−−→relupAJxi, jK (cf. Line 5) and←−−−relupAJxi, jK (cf. Line 11), which
would have to be replaced with the transfer functions corre-
sponding to the considered activation function. Piecewise-
linear activation functions, like Leaky ReLU(x) = max(x ,k ·
x) or Hard TanH(x) = max(−1,min(x , 1)), can be treated
analogously to ReLUs. Other functions, e.g., Sigmoid(x) =
1
1+e−x , can be soundly over-approximated [57].
10 Implementation
We implemented our causal-fairness analysis described in the
previous section in a tool called libra. The implementation
is written in python and is open-source2.
Tool inputs. libra takes as input a neural-network model
M expressed as a python program (cf. Section 3), a speci-
fication of the input layer l0 of M, an abstract domain for
the forward pre-analysis, and budget constraints L and U.
2https://github.com/caterinaurban/Libra
The specification for l0 determines which input nodes corre-
spond to continuous and (one-hot encoded) categorical data
and, among them, which should be considered bias sensitive.
We assume that continuous data is in the range [0, 1]. A set
Y of initial states of interest is specified using an assumption
at the beginning of the program representation ofM.
Abstract domains. For the forward pre-analysis, choices
of the abstract domain are either boxes (i.e., boxes in the
following) or a combination of boxes and symbolic constant
propagation [40, 46] (i.e., boxes+symbolic in the following).
As previously mentioned, we use disjunctive polyhedra for
the backward analysis. All abstract domains are built on top
of the apron abstract-domain library [34].
Parallelization. Both forward and backward analyses are
parallelized to run on multiple CPU cores. The pre-analysis
uses a queue from which each process draws a fraction I of
Y (cf. Line 17). Fractions that need to be partitioned further
are split in half along one of the non-sensitive dimensions
(in a round-robin fashion), and the resulting (sub)fractions
are put back into the queue (cf. Line 26). Feasible Is (with
their corresponding abstract activation pattern p) are put
into another queue (cf. Line 22) for the backward analysis.
Tool outputs. The analysis returns the fractions of Y that
were analyzed and any (sub)regions of these where bias was
found. It also reports the percentage of the input space that
was analyzed and (an estimate of) the percentage that was
found biased. To obtain the latter, for simplicity, we just use
the size of a box wrapped around each biased region. More
precise but also costlier solutions exist [6].
11 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our approach by focusing on the
following research questions:
RQ1: Can our analysis detect seeded (i.e., injected) bias?
RQ2: Is our analysis able to answer specific bias queries?
RQ3: How does the model structure affect the scalability
of the analysis?
RQ4: How does the analysis budget affect the scalability-
vs-precision tradeoff?
RQ5: Can our analysis effectively leveragemultiple CPUs?
11.1 Data
For our evaluation, we used public datasets from the UCI
Machine Learning Repository and ProPublica (see below for
more details) to train several neural-network models. We
primarily focused on datasets discussed in the literature [44]
or used by related techniques (e.g., [1–3, 7, 21, 23, 62, 63]).
We pre-processed these datasets both to make them fair
with respect to a certain sensitive input feature as well as to
seed bias. We describe how we seeded bias in each particular
dataset later in this section.
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Table 1. Analysis of Neural Networks Trained on Fair and {Age, Credit > 1000}-Biased Data (German Credit Data) — Full Table
credit fair data biased dataU bias |C| |F| time U bias |C| |F| time
12 0.33% 138 32 32 52s 12 0.79% 196 56 56 7m 50s
12 0.17% 165 23 23 4m 16s 12 0.31% 141 26 26 1m 11s
12 0.09% 140 10 10 29s 12 0.90% 198 59 59 14m 27s
12 0.15% 159 22 22 2m 3s 12 0.42% 189 37 37 3m 42s
12 0.23% 157 25 25 1m 56s 12 0.00% 130 13 13 22s
12 0.30% 166 32 32 1m 11s 12 0.41% 176 37 37 2m 56s
12 0.20% 135 25 25 1m 4s 12 0.48% 181 39 39 1m 20s
≤ 1000
12 0.16% 168 14 14 17s 12 0.09% 196 10 10 1m 42s
min 0.09% 17s 0.00% 22s
median 0.19% 1m 8s 0.41% 2m 19s
max 0.33% 4m 16s 0.90% 14m 27s
12 12, 20% 202 101 101 32m 9s 15 27.59% 310 264 265 7h 21m 1s
15 7.43% 215 103 103 2h 51m 10s 12 30.77% 252 182 184 42m 56s
12 2.21% 155 22 22 1m 23s 16 33.19% 273 233 236 12h 50m 6s
12 4.29% 185 39 39 10m 51s 12 16.45% 236 189 189 1h 50m 57s
12 9.73% 172 84 84 23m 13s 12 0.00% 165 5 5 17s
12 14.96% 234 173 176 4h 25m 47s 12 17.24% 246 171 172 1h 16m 31s
12 6.00% 199 67 67 27m 17s 16 19.23% 206 138 138 3h 39m 57s
> 1000
12 4.61% 200 48 48 23m 37s 12 4.52% 224 94 94 1h 5m 13s
min 2.21% 1m 23s 0.00% 17s
median 6.72% 25m 27s 18.24% 1h 33m 44s
max 14.96% 4h 25m 47s 33.19% 12h 50m 6s
Our methodology for making the data fair was common
across datasets. In particular, given an original dataset and a
sensitive feature (say, race), we selected the largest popula-
tion with a particular value for this feature (say, Caucasian)
from the dataset (and discarded all others). We removed
any duplicate or inconsistent entries from this population.
We then duplicated the population for every other value of
the sensitive feature (say, Asian and Hispanic). For example,
assuming the largest population was 500 Caucasians, we
created 500 Asians and 500 Hispanics, and any two of these
populations differ only in the value of race. Consequently,
the new dataset is causally fair because there do not exist two
inputs k and k ′ that differ only in the value of the sensitive
feature for which the classification outcomes are different.
We define the causal-unfairness score of a dataset as the
percentage of inputs k in the dataset for which there exists
another input k ′ that differs from k only in the value of the
sensitive feature and the classification outcome. Our fair
datasets have an unfairness score of 0%.
11.2 Setup
Since neural-network training is non-deterministic, we typi-
cally train eight neural networks (with four hidden layers
with five nodes) on each dataset, unless stated otherwise.
We performed all experiments on a 12-core Intel ® Xeon
® X5650 CPU @ 2.67GHz machine with 48GB of memory,
running Debian GNU/Linux 9.6 (stretch). All datasets and
models we used are also open-source as part of libra.
11.3 Results
In the following, we present our experimental results for
each of the above research questions.
RQ1: Detecting seeded bias. This research question focuses
on detecting seeded bias by comparing the analysis results
for models trained with fair versus biased data.
For this experiment, we used the German Credit Data3.
This dataset classifies creditworthiness into two categories,
“good” and “bad”. An input feature is age, which we consider
sensitive to bias. We seeded bias in the fair dataset by ran-
domly assigning a bad credit score to people of age 60 and
above who request a credit amount of more than EUR 1 000
until we reached a 20% causal-unfairness score of the dataset.
The median classification accuracy of the models trained on
fair and biased data was 71% and 65%, respectively.
Table 1 shows the analysis results for all models. For the
forward pre-analysis, we used the boxes+symbolic domain.
We set L = 0 to be sure to complete the analysis on 100%
of the input space. The drawback with this is that the pre-
analysis might end up splitting input partitions endlessly.
To counteract, for each model, we chose the smallest up-
per bound that did not cause this issue. Column U shows
the chosen upper bound for each model. Column |C| shows
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+(German+Credit+Data)
Perfectly Parallel Certification of Neural Network Fairness
Table 2. Queries on Neural Networks Trained on Fair and Race-Biased Data (ProPublica’s compas Data) — Full Table
qery fair data biased dataU bias |C| |F| time U bias |C| |F| time
10 0.23% 52 22 23 1h 49m 12s 10 0.83% 26 24 24 2h 32m 53s
10 0.83% 44 18 18 26m 23s 10 8.79% 60 33 34 19m 2s
10 0.22% 42 16 16 44m 59s 10 1.15% 24 14 14 16m 51s
10 0.24% 175 33 33 45m 36s 10 0.42% 17 16 16 8m 27s
10 0.30% 151 63 63 51m 6s 10 0.12% 32 14 14 22m 47s
10 0.33% 67 19 19 54m 45s 10 1.59% 33 27 27 1h 59m 57s
10 1.19% 27 24 24 12m 33s 10 3.34% 162 122 122 39m 38s
age < 25
race bias?
10 2.46% 17 16 16 16m 35s 10 0.18% 17 16 16 11m 36s
min 0.22% 12m 33s 0.12% 8m 27s
median 0.32% 45m 17s 0.99% 20m 54s
max 2.46% 1h 49m 12s 8.79% 2h 32m 53s
10 0.00% 335 147 335 38m 58s 10 0.00% 343 164 343 1h 32m 10s
10 0.00% 306 124 191 44m 33s 10 0.00% 730 265 730 1h 10m 7s
10 0.00% 258 75 258 33m 38s 10 0.00% 268 119 268 25m 23s
10 0.00% 1443 211 395 45m 43s 10 0.00% 103 73 103 45m 55s
10 0.00% 1298 414 714 51m 44s 10 0.00% 408 131 263 32m 14s
10 0.00% 517 266 517 1h 39m 27s 10 0.00% 305 123 279 1h 55m 16s
10 0.00% 504 138 353 17m 28s 10 0.00% 681 319 414 35m 15s
male
age bias?
10 0.00% 403 222 381 46m 16s 10 0.00% 391 280 391 57m 36s
min 0.00% 17m 28s 0.00% 25m 23s
median 0.00% 45m 8s 0.00% 51m 45s
max 0.00% 1h 39m 27s 0.00% 1h 55m 16s
12 2.18% 46 39 39 8h 20m 48s 15 2.92% 44 43 43 9h 15m 19s
12 3.66% 68 57 57 2h 1m 43s 15 6.98% 45 41 41 1h 24m 13s
15 2.73% 46 43 43 3h 45m 15s 12 4.43% 45 39 39 31m 38s
19 2.19% 47 46 46 28h 48m 46s 12 3.40% 42 41 41 36m 10s
19 3.17% 212 212 212 156h 56m 42s 15 3.09% 39 38 38 2h 34m 28s
12 2.45% 57 43 43 6h 21m 40s 15 5.79% 54 52 53 4h 35m 30s
15 3.94% 48 45 45 3h 29m 22s 19 5.10% 49 48 48 52h 11m 13s
caucasian
priors bias?
15 5.36% 47 46 46 7h 3m 25s 17 3.99% 46 44 44 13h 1m 5s
min 2.18% 2h 1m 43s 2.92% 31m 38s
median 2.95% 6h 42m 32s 4.21% 3h 34m 59s
max 5.36% 156h 56m 42s 6.98% 52h 11m 13s
the total number of analyzed (i.e., completed) input space
partitions. Column |F| shows the total number of abstract
activation patterns (left) and feasible input partitions (right)
that the backward analysis had to explore. The difference
between |C| and the number of partitions shown in |F| are
the input partitions that the pre-analysis found to be already
fair (i.e., uniquely classified). Columns bias and time show
the detected bias (in percentage of the entire input space)
and the analysis running time, respectively. In particular, the
table shows whether the models are biased with respect to
age for credit requests of 1 000 or less as well as for credit
requests of over 1 000. We also report minimum, median, and
maximum values for both bias and analysis running time.
We observe that, for models trained on fair data, age bias
for credit amounts ≤ 1 000 is very small in comparison
to larger amounts. This is because small credit amounts
correspond to a mere 4% of the input space. When only
considering the input space of amounts ≤ 1 000, the median
bias is 0.19% / 4% = 4.75%, whereas when only considering
larger amounts, the median bias is 6.72% / 96% = 7%. This
shows that the models contain bias that does not necessarily
depend on the credit amount. The bias is introduced by the
training process itself (as explained in the Introduction) and
is not due to imprecision of our analysis. Recall that our
approach is exact, and imprecision is only introduced when
estimating the bias percentage (cf. Section 10).
For the models trained on biased data, the analysis finds
significantly more bias for larger credit amounts in compari-
son to the models trained on the fair dataset. As expected, it
also finds similar bias across the different models for smaller
credit amounts. This demonstrates that our approach is able
to effectively detect seeded bias. It is interesting to point out
that the model on the fourth row of the table does not pick
up the bias introduced in the dataset, which of course only
corresponds to a small sample of the input space.
RQ2: Answering specific bias queries. To further evaluate
the precision of our approach, we created queries concerning
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Table 3. Comparison of Different Model Structures (Adult Census Data) — Full Table
|M| U boxes boxes+symbolicinput |C| |F| time input |C| |F| time
4 86.81% 1447 230 1142 28m 2s 93.61% 1110 227 699 16m 57s
6 99.51% 786 255 739 59m 15s 99.93% 581 231 450 39m 16s
8 100.00% 152 118 143 4h 55m 57s 100.00% 174 133 146 3h 24m 42s
10# 
10 100.00% 1 1 1 56m 18s 100.00% 1 1 1 56m 22s
4 49.76% 712 26 334 12m 26s 72.22% 1176 39 558 21m 48s
6 72.67% 1191 60 926 2h 2m 57s 98.54% 331 36 193 20m 38s
8 98.68% 342 56 284 1h 38m 31s 98.78% 323 41 190 41m 0s
12
△▲
10 99.06% 313 65 260 1h 25m 42s 99.06% 307 47 182 1h 12m 5s
4 22.01% 625 24 39 2m 6s 44.06% 845 48 92 14m 26s
6 45.24% 1111 123 260 21m 30s 60.03% 895 166 406 42m 22s
8 64.17% 1108 299 795 2h 46m 48s 74.10% 1122 305 779 2h 8m 25s
20
♢♦
10 85.87% 1376 387 1329 >13h 89.24% 1425 376 1150 >13h
4 0.00% 0 0 0 1m 5s 0.69% 20 1 1 3m 33s
6 0.00% 0 0 0 1m 5s 3.19% 92 5 5 40m 40s
8 0.14% 4 1 2 13m 58s 9.48% 258 28 28 2h 40m 43s
40
□■
10 0.63% 18 12 13 1h 48m 43s 19.62% 544 74 75 12h 25m 43s
4 0.00% 0 0 0 1m 9s 27.26% 697 25 49 8m 24s
6 0.83% 24 3 22 3m 44s 39.65% 771 84 147 24m 1s
8 9.41% 270 58 234 22m 49s 47.47% 712 141 238 55m 30s
45D
10 18.68% 522 150 488 1h 39m 33s 49.62% 651 168 283 3h 24m 15s
bias within specific groups of people, each corresponding to
a subset of the entire input space.
We used the compas dataset4 from ProPublica for this
experiment. The data assigns a recidivism-risk score (high,
medium, and low) indicating whether criminals are likely to
re-offend. The data includes both personal attributes (e.g.,
age and race) as well as criminal history (e.g., number of
priors and violent crimes). As for RQ1, we trained models
both on fair and biased data. Here, we considered race as the
sensitive feature. We seeded bias in the fair data by randomly
assigning high recidivism risk to African Americans until
we reached a 20% causal-unfairness score of the dataset. The
median classification accuracy of the models trained on fair
and biased data was 55% and 56%, respectively.
To analyze these models, we used the boxes+symbolic
domain for the forward pre-analysis, a lower bound L of 0,
and an upper bound U between 10 and 19. Table 2 summa-
rizes the results of our analysis (i.e., all columns are shown
as in Table 1) for three queries:
QA: Is there race-bias for people younger than 25?
QB : Is there age-bias for males?
QC : Is there number-of-priors-bias for Caucasians?
The analysis is able to complete 100% of the input space
for each query. For QA, the analysis detects only a small
percentage of bias in the fair models, but as expected, the
bias is found to be significantly higher (ca. 3X) for the biased
models. In contrast, for QB , the analysis is able to verify that
4https://www.propublica.org/datastore/dataset/
compas-recidivism-risk-score-data-and-analysis
there is no bias for males in both sets of models. Finally, for
QC , the analysis detects significant bias with respect to the
number of priors. Note that the bias percentages are always
with respect to the entire input space; not just with respect
to Caucasians (for Qc ) representing 1/6 of the input space.
Also, note that we did not introduce any bias with respect
to the number of priors, so this bias is intended and present
in the original data. As one would expect, recidivism risk
differs for different numbers of priors. Overall, these results
demonstrate the effectiveness of our analysis in answering
specific bias queries by detecting bias or verifying its absence.
RQ3: Effect of model structure on scalability. This re-
search question evaluates the effect of the model structure
on the scalability of our analysis. To answer it, we trained
models on the Adult Census Data5 by varying the number
of layers and nodes per layer. The dataset assigns a yearly
income (> or ≤ USD 50K) based on personal attributes such
as gender, race, and occupation. We trained all models on
a fair dataset with respect to gender and ensured that each
model reached a minimum classification accuracy of 78%.
Table 3 summarizes the results for all models. The first
column shows the total number of hidden nodes and intro-
duces the marker symbols used in the scatter plot of Figure 3
(the left symbol refers to the boxes domain, whereas the
right one refers to the boxes+symbolic domain used by the
forward pre-analysis). The models use the following number
5https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
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Figure 3. Comparison of Different Model Structures (Adult
Census Data)
of hidden layers and nodes per layer (from top to bottom): 2
and 5; 4 and 3; 4 and 5; 4 and 10; 9 and 5.
Column U shows the upper bound chosen for each model,
while the input and time columns show the input-space
coverage (i.e., the percentage of the input space that was
completed by the analysis) and the running time. As before,
column |C| shows the number of completed input space
partitions, and |F| shows the number of abstract activation
patterns (left) and feasible input partitions (right) explored
by the backward analysis. We used a lower bound L of 0.5
and a total-time limit of 13h.
The scatter plot of Figure 3 visualizes the input cover-
age and analysis running time. Overall, coverage decreases
for more complex model structures and the more precise (but
expensive) boxes+symbolic domain results in a significant
coverage boost, especially for more complex structures.
Increasing the upper bound U tends to increase coverage
independently of the specific model structure. However, in-
terestingly, this does not always come at the expense of an
increased running time. In fact, as wewill explain in RQ4, such
a change tends to help the forward pre-analysis in already
proving certain partitions fair. This results in decreasing the
number of partitions that the expensive backward analysis
needs to analyze as well as the overall running time.
RQ4: Scalability-vs-precision tradeoff. To evaluate the ef-
fect of the analysis budget (bounds L and U), we analyzed
a model using different budget configurations. For this ex-
periment, we used the Japanese Credit Screening6 dataset,
which we made fair with respect to gender. Our model had
a classification accuracy of 86%.
Table 4 shows the results for different analysis configu-
rations and domains of the forward pre-analysis. Note that
the symbol next to each domain introduces the marker used
in the scatter plot of Figure 4, which visualizes the coverage
and running time.
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Japanese+Credit+Screening
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Figure 4. Comparison of Different Analysis Configurations
(Japanese Credit Screening)
Overall, we observe that the more precise boxes+symbolic
domain boosts input coverage (most noticeably for configura-
tions with a larger L). Surprisingly, this additional precision
does not always result in longer running times. In fact, for
long-running analyses, boxes+symbolic typically reduces the
running time. This is because the classification within more
partitions is proved fair already by the pre-analysis without
requiring the backward analysis.
As expected, a larger U or a smaller L increase precision.
Increasing U or L typically reduces the number of partitions.
Consequently, partitions tend to be more complex, requiring
both forward and backward analyses. Since the backward
analysis tends to dominate the running time, more partitions
generally increase the running time (when comparing con-
figurations with similar coverage). Based on our experience,
the optimal budget largely depends on the analyzed model.
RQ5: Leveraging multiple CPU cores. To evaluate the ef-
fect of parallelizing the analysis using multiple cores, we
re-ran the analyses of RQ4 on 4 CPU cores instead of 12.
Table 5 shows these results. For the boxes domain, we observe
a significant increase in running time for 4 cores, especially
for configurations that achieve high coverage. For instance,
the running time increases by a factor of 3.4 for L = 0 and
U = 10. On the other hand, for the boxes+symbolic domain,
the running time with 4 cores typically increases less drasti-
cally. This is again explained by the increased precision of
the forward analysis; fewer partitions require a backward
pass, where parallelization is most effective.
Finally, Table 6 shows the same experiment on 24 vCPUs.
12 Related Work
Significant progress has been made on testing and verifying
machine-learning models. We focus on fairness, safety, and
robustness properties in the following, especially of deep
neural networks.
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Table 4. Comparison of Different Analysis Configurations (Japanese Credit Screening) — 12 CPUs
L U boxes boxes+symbolicinput |C| |F| time input |C| |F| time
4 2.08% 6 0 0 7s 42.01% 71 13 23 1m 44s
6 11.11% 28 7 7 50s 68.40% 96 34 43 8m 47s
8 51.39% 98 55 87 12m 1s 82.64% 103 72 80 18m 3s0.5
10 79.86% 83 67 83 22m 48s 93.06% 91 79 82 42m 49s
4 41.91% 1225 41 415 54m 8s 92.14% 955 120 407 25m 8s
6 79.77% 1470 214 957 45m 22s 97.81% 507 163 278 25m 2s
8 95.92% 1159 476 969 2h 15m 14s 99.72% 389 220 294 33m 26s0.25
10 99.54% 437 294 434 1h 40m 52s 99.98% 174 143 162 58m 35s
4 94.68% 16348 671 9191 3h 22m 2s 99.64% 2167 194 727 42m 22s
6 99.74% 6219 951 3955 2h 41m 2s 99.99% 1115 264 537 45m 31s
8 99.98% 1775 786 1450 2h 8m 22s 100.00% 293 192 233 30m 38s0.125
10 100.00% 399 287 399 1h 36m 48s 100.00% 155 137 145 58m 36s
4 94.68% 47380 1133 18005 7h 41m 41s 99.64% 3780 196 730 43m 16s
6 99.74% 5369 938 3414 2h 17m 26s 99.99% 783 204 349 54m 21s
8 99.98% 1531 751 1273 1h 48m 38s 100.00% 360 217 275 37m 23s0
10 100.00% 512 354 506 1h 47m 54s 100.00% 163 142 152 56m 1s
Table 5. Comparison of Different Analysis Configurations (Japanese Credit Screening) — 4 CPUs
L U boxes boxes+symbolicinput |C| |F| time input |C| |F| time
4 2.08% 6 0 0 19s 42.01% 79 17 29 2m 42s
6 11.11% 30 6 7 1m 2s 68.40% 124 40 55 14m 8s
8 51.39% 90 57 85 20m 37s 82.64% 137 82 93 29m 40s0.5
10 79.86% 128 108 123 1h 16m 28s 93.06% 108 86 95 57m 54s
4 41.91% 1159 42 379 54m 16s 92.14% 1010 120 364 28m 14s
6 79.77% 1456 210 969 1h 53m 1s 97.81% 776 216 429 55m 41s
8 95.92% 926 407 804 3h 17m 18s 99.72% 296 192 234 1h 13m 32s0.25
10 99.54% 519 342 506 5h 28m 27s 99.98% 204 156 180 2h 0m 17s
4 94.68% 15993 681 8739 9h 19m 36s 99.64% 3470 231 1120 1h 24m 57s
6 99.74% 4951 851 3257 6h 19m 56s 99.99% 786 208 371 51m 24s
8 99.98% 1548 745 1317 5h 43m 12s 100.00% 303 189 232 1h 9m 21s0.125
10 100.00% 506 344 500 5h 42m 11s 100.00% 168 138 157 1h 56m 41s
4 94.68% 36165 1076 14877 >13h 99.64% 6700 235 1245 1h 41m 58s
6 99.74% 5802 955 3592 7h 27m 41s 99.99% 1156 264 537 1h 14m 6s
8 99.98% 1552 751 1297 5h 21m 11s 100.00% 360 217 275 1h 22m 23s0
10 100.00% 528 373 521 5h 37m 28s 100.00% 199 152 179 1h 44m 3s
Testing and verifying fairness. Galhotra et al. [23] pro-
posed an approach, Themis, that allows efficient fairness
testing of software. Udeshi et al. [63] designed an automated
and directed testing technique to generate discriminatory
inputs for machine-learning models. Tramer et al. [62] in-
troduced the unwarranted-associations framework and in-
stantiated it in FairTest. In contrast, our technique provides
formal fairness guarantees.
Bastani et al. [7] used adaptive concentration inequali-
ties to design a scalable technique for verifying fairness of
machine-learning models. Albarghouthi et al. [2] encoded
fairness problems as probabilistic program properties and
developed an SMT-based technique for verifying fairness
of decision-making programs. For certain biased decision-
making programs, the program repair technique proposed
by Albarghouthi et al. [1] can be used to repair their bias.
Albarghouthi et al. [3] further introduced fairness-aware pro-
gramming, where programmers can specify fairness prop-
erties in their code for runtime checking. As mentioned in
the Introduction, our approach differs in that it gives defi-
nite (instead of probabilistic) guarantees. However, it might
exclude partitions for which the analysis is not exact.
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Table 6. Comparison of Different Analysis Configurations (Japanese Credit Screening) — 24 vCPUs
L U boxes boxes+symbolicinput |C| |F| time input |C| |F| time
4 2.08% 6 0 0 6s 42.01% 71 13 23 1m 33s
6 11.11% 30 6 7 44s 68.40% 102 40 53 4m 43s
8 51.39% 125 65 101 16m 44s 82.64% 102 68 77 21m 19s0.5
10 79.86% 101 81 98 29m 43s 93.06% 104 84 92 45m 6s
4 41.91% 1211 41 381 38m 40s 92.14% 936 126 349 38m 4s
6 79.77% 1423 207 944 43m 21s 97.81% 541 178 287 23m 38s
8 95.92% 978 432 835 1h 12m 1s 99.72% 362 210 284 52m 32s0.25
10 99.54% 409 295 403 1h 37m 51s 99.98% 197 150 177 1h 10m 28s
4 94.68% 21388 678 11490 4h 46m 44s 99.64% 3619 227 1199 59m 56s
6 99.74% 6124 961 3956 2h 32m 2s 99.99% 910 232 433 33m 7s
8 99.98% 1513 729 1267 1h 43m 53s 100.00% 348 203 266 49m 59s0.125
10 100.00% 596 392 578 2h 43m 43s 100.00% 176 137 156 1h 32m 9s
4 94.68% 48195 1119 18148 8h 29m 51s 99.64% 5171 226 1019 1h 14m 7s
6 99.74% 7484 1093 4629 3h 10m 35s 99.99% 837 221 388 31m 36s
8 99.98% 1439 728 1235 1h 41m 27s 100.00% 319 198 248 38m 39s0
10 100.00% 483 353 472 1h 39m 44s 100.00% 160 138 150 1h 1m 23s
Robustness of deep neural networks. Robustness is a de-
sirable property for traditional software [12, 30, 43], espe-
cially control systems. Deep neural networks are also ex-
pected to be robust. However, research has shown that deep
neural networks are not robust to small perturbations of
their inputs [59] and can even be easily fooled [51]. Subtle
imperceptible perturbations of inputs, known as adversar-
ial examples, can change their prediction results. Various
algorithms [11, 28, 42, 60, 66] have been proposed that can
effectively find adversarial examples. Research on develop-
ing defense mechanisms against adversarial examples [4, 9–
11, 15, 22, 28, 32, 48, 49] is also active. Causal fairness of
neural networks is a special form of robustness in the sense
that neural networks are expected to be globally robust with
respect to their sensitive features.
Testing deep learning systems. Multiple frameworks have
been proposed to test the robustness of deep learning sys-
tems. Pei et al. [54] proposed the first whitebox framework
for testing such systems. They used neuron coverage to mea-
sure the adequacy of test inputs. Sun et al. [58] presented the
first concolic-testing [26, 56] approach for neural networks.
Tian et al. [61] and Zhang et al. [67] proposed frameworks
for testing autonomous driving systems. Gopinath et al. [29]
used symbolic execution [14, 37]. Odena et al. [53] were the
first to develop coverage-guided fuzzing for neural networks.
Zhang et al. [66] proposed a blackbox-fuzzing technique to
test their robustness.
Formal verification of deep neural networks. Formal ver-
ification of deep neural networks has mainly focused on
safety properties. However, the scalability of such techniques
for verifying large real-world neural networks is limited.
Early work [55] applied abstract interpretation to verify a
neural network with six neurons. Recent work [24, 33, 35,
57, 65] significantly improves scalability. Huang et al.[33]
proposed a framework that can verify local robustness of
neural networks based on SMT techniques [5]. Katz et al. [35]
developed an efficient SMT solver for neural networks with
ReLU activation functions. Gehr et al. [24] traded precision
for scalability and proposed a sound abstract interpreter that
can prove local robustness of realistic deep neural networks.
Singh et al. [57] proposed a new abstract domain for certi-
fying robustness of neural networks. Their abstract domain
could also be used in our setting to certify fairness proper-
ties. Wang et al. [65] are the first to use symbolic interval
arithmetic to prove security properties of neural networks.
13 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented an automated, perfectly parallel analysis
for certifying fairness of neural networks. The analysis is
configurable to support a wide range of use cases throughout
the development lifecycle of neural networks: ranging from
short sanity checks during development to formal fairness
audits before deployments.
In future work, we plan to extend our technique in various
ways. For instance, by automatically tuning parameters (such
as the upper bound U) during the analysis or by feeding
analysis results to other tools. Such tools may be used to
provide probabilistic fairness guarantees for partitions that
could not be certified or repair networks by eliminating bias.
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